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INTRODUCTION

I am honored to offer an Introduction to Crystal Enekwa's Comment,
which follows. Her work evidences her close examination of capital
punishment as currently practiced in the United States, and invites
consideration of the views of persons most familiar with the operation of
the death penalty to assess the punishment's value.
The starting point for her examination of the death penalty is a
proposition penned forty years ago. In his concurrence in Furman v.
Georgia, Justice Thurgood Marshall stated that support for the death
penalty should not be based on public opinion polls nor abstract sentiment,
"but on whether people who were fully informed as to the purposes of the
penalty and its liabilities would find the penalty shocking, unjust, and
unacceptable."' Justice Marshall then discussed seven paradoxes of capital
punishment that were "critical to an informed judgment on the morality of

* Associate Professor, The University of Tennessee College of Law. Many thanks
to Judy Cornett and David Wolitz for comments and suggestions.
1. 408 U.S. 238, 361 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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the death penalty." 2 He confidently predicted that "[a]ssuming knowledge
of all the facts presently available regarding capital punishment, the average
citizen would, in my opinion, find it shocking to his conscience and sense
of justice. For this reason alone capital punishment cannot stand."3 His
proposal has been called the Marshall Hypothesis.
In her thought-provoking Comment, Ms. Enekwa proposes applying the
Marshall Hypothesis to the real world. Taking Justice Marshall's
jurisprudence seriously, she suggests that current criticisms of the
administration of the death penalty, as articulated by those most familiar
with its operation, serve as the basis for capital punishment reform. In lieu
of abstract pronouncements on capital punishment, she has collected the
views of prison employees, capital defense lawyers, former prosecutors,
spiritual advisors to capital inmates, and family members of persons killed
in capital crimes. She could have added to that a chorus of some state and
federal court judges whose experience adjudicating capital cases influenced
their views on the appropriateness of the punishment.
All of these persons, for at least part of their lives, did not question the
legitimacy of capital punishment (or, if they did, they suppressed those
2. Id. at 362.
3. Id. at 369.
4. For example, Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Ray L. Brock, Jr., who served
from 1974 through his retirement in 1987, began dissenting in capital cases in 1981,
declaring that the punishment was cruel and unusual punishment under Article I, Section 16
of the Tennessee Constitution. See State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126 (Tenn. 1981) (Brock, J.,
dissenting) (declaring his opposition).
Washington Supreme Court Justice Robert F. Utter resigned in 1995 because he
was convinced that the death penalty could not be applied fairly. See Jack Hopkins, Death
Penalty Inequities Prompt State High Court Justice to Retire, SEATTLE PosTINTELLIGENCER, Mar. 30, 1995, at Al.
U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens wrote "that the imposition of the
death penalty represents the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal
contributions to any discernible social or public purposes. A penalty with such negligible
returns to the State is patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of the
Eighth Amendment." Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 86 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun declared, "Because I no longer can
state with any confidence that this Court is able to reconcile the Eighth Amendment's
competing constitutional commands, or that the Federal Judiciary will provide meaningful
oversight to the state courts as they exercise their authority to inflict the penalty of death, I
believe that the death penalty, as currently administered, is unconstitutional." Callins v.
Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1158-59 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell expressed a pragmatic
opposition to the death penalty. He said that capital punishment should be abolished because
it served no useful purpose, and it did not deter. To him, the death penalty was not fairly and
expeditiously enforced. See JoHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEwis F. POWELL, JR.: A
BIOGRAPHY 451-53 (1994).
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doubts) and worked toward ensuring it was implemented fairly. But after
having "up-close and personal" experiences-some over many cases, and
all over many years-with the modem capital punishment system, they
came to oppose the death penalty.
In this Introduction, I review and reflect on the Marshall Hypothesis to
place Ms. Enekwa's Comment in context. To that end, Part I provides a
brief overview of Justice Marshall's appointment to the United States
Supreme Court. Part II details Justice Marshall's Furman concurrence, in
which he declared that the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment,
and his sentiments four years later in Gregg v. Georgia,s in which he stated
that retribution had no role to play in capital punishment. Part III
summarizes research testing the Marshall Hypothesis. Part IV briefly
reviews the careers of three of Justice Marshall's Supreme Court
colleagues, and statements late in their careers in which they each
questioned the efficacy of the death penalty. Part V concludes.
I. JUSTICE MARSHALL, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE DEATH PENALTY

In June 1967, when announcing his decision to nominate Thurgood
Marshall to serve as the first African American on the United States
Supreme Court, President Lyndon Johnson after noting, among other
things, his success as an advocate before the Court, declared that it was "the6
right thing to do, the right time to do it, the right man and the right place."
President Johnson correctly perceived that Marshall would provide a
reliable liberal vote.'
Justice Marshall's background and experience as a civil rights lawyer,
including litigating race discrimination cases, and as a capital defense
attorney might have led one to expect that he would bring special insights
in reviewing claims brought by the traditionally marginalized and in capital
cases. Justice Marshall unquestionably did this throughout his tenure;
however, all of Justice Marshall's biographers indicate that prior to
Furman, he had not expressed an interest in ending the death penalty.8

5. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
6. Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks to the Press Announcing the Nomination of
Thurgood Marshall as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (June 13, 1967), availableat
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28298.
7. President Lyndon Johnson may not have had a firm grasp of Thurgood Marshall's
judicial philosophy, but he did believe that Marshall "would just be in the liberals' pocket
100 percent of the time." JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN
REVOLUTIONARY 7 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
8. As a circuit judge, Justice Marshall expressed no reservations about the death
penalty. The influences that drove him to become an abolitionist while on the High Court
remain uncertain. One biographer suggests it was the product of Justice Brennan's influence.
See WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 351. Another biographer states that Justice Marshall's

384

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:381

II. FURMAN AND GREGG

In the first five years of Justice Marshall's appointment to the Supreme
Court, that body had intermittently subjected parts of the death penalty
process to constitutional scrutiny.9 After a few years of addressing
procedural issues, the Court, in 1972, directly addressed the
constitutionality of capital punishment. In Furman v. Georgia, by a 5-4
vote, the Court ruled that all of the death penalty statutes in this country
were unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
Throughout his Supreme Court service Justice Marshall's opinions in
criminal law cases had special resonance. He tended to focus on what
happened to bring the case to the Court and the real life consequences of the
Court's decisions; this was especially true in capital cases." But Furman

opposition was partially based on losing the capital case of a high school classmate. See
MICHAEL D. DAVIS & HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD MARSHALL: WARRIOR AT THE
BAR, REBEL ON THE BENCH 320 (1992).
9. See Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970) (remanding capital case because
prospective jurors were excluded on grounds ruled impermissible in Witherspoon v. Illinois);
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (finding due process violated when trial judge did
not inquire on the record whether defendant's plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered);
Jackson v. United States, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (holding that Federal Kidnapping Act violated
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments because it authorized a jury to sentence a defendant to
death if the victim had been harmed during the kidnapping but a lesser sentence was
authorized for bench trials or guilty pleas); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1967)
(holding that automatic removal of prospective capital jurors who were opposed to or who
expressed conscientious scruples against capital punishment violated the Sixth
Amendment's fair cross-section provision). Justice Marshall recused himself from
participating in Jackson v. United States, apparently because he participated in the case
when he was Solicitor General. See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 591.
10. See David L. Bazelon, Humanizing the CriminalProcess: Some Decisions of Mr.
Justice Marshall,6 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 3 (1980) (noting that Marshall's opinions in criminal
cases sought to ensure that the rich and poor can participate equally in the adversary
system); Bruce A. Green & Daniel Richman, Of Laws and Men: An Essay on Justice
Marshall's View of Criminal Procedure, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 369 (1994) (suggesting
Marshall's criminal procedure decisions were based on his conception of the humanity of
those who wielded state authority and of those who might be subjected to it); Charles J.
Ogletree, Justice Marshall'sCriminal Justice Jurisprudence: "The Right Thing To Do, The
Right Time To Do It, The Right Man and The Right Place," 6 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 112
(1989) (noting that Justice Marshall's opinions reflect the need for procedural fairness and
substantive justice).
11. See John D. Burrow, The Most Unfortunate Decisions: Forging and
Understandingof Justice Thurgood Marshall'sJurisprudenceof Death, 6 How. SCROLL:
SOC. JUST. L. REv. 1 (2003) (describing Marshall's death penalty jurisprudence as sociolegal engineering in that it identified the constitutional defects in the capital punishment
process and humanized capital defendants); Randall Coyne, Taking the Death Penalty
Personally: Justice Thurgood Marshall, 47 OKLA. L. REv. 42 (1994) (suggesting that
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was different. Instead of employing an empathetic approach, he focused
less on the facts of the four cases before the Court, and more on the
operation of the death penalty in this country. His opinion starts with a
traditional legal analysis before concluding in a theoretical and prophetic
tone. Justice Marshall's concurrence stands out in tone and substance from
the opinions of his eight colleagues. 12 The death penalty having been the
law in the United States, Justice Marshall wrote about the progress the
United States had made in reforming the death penalty up to that day in
1972, and, most importantly, about the future of capital punishment in this
country. His Furman concurrence may be his most important opinion,
adding to his legacy as a Justice.
A. JusticeMarshall'sFurman Concurrence

Unlike the other Justices, Justice Marshall adopted an absolutist
approach'-3 -declaring the death penalty unconstitutional. Justice Marshall
first described the historical and legal antecedents of the Eighth
Amendment. 14 He then discussed the relevant Supreme Court cases
interpreting the Amendment.15 He concluded that these cases had
interpreted the Eighth Amendment to "draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."" The

Marshall's continued objections to capital punishment were rooted in his experience as a
capital defense attorney and the inequitable administration of capital punishment); Tracey B.
Fitzpatrick, Justice Thurgood MarshallandCapitalPunishment: SocialJustice and the Rule

ofLaw, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1065 (1995) (maintaining that Marshall's capital punishment
jurisprudence adhered to his vision of equal justice for all and respect for the rule of law);
Gerald F. Ulemen, Justice Thurgood Marshall and the Death Penalty: A Former Criminal
Defense Lawyer on the Supreme Court, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403 (1994) (noting Marshall's

continuing concern about the quality of capital defense attorneys).
12. One source described Marshall's concurrence this way: "The fifty-eight-page
draft was an unusually scholarly and comprehensive treatise on the history of the death
penalty in America and England. Marshall argued for an absolute ban and had assembled
every conceivable argument that the death penalty was discriminatory." BOB WOODWARD &
Scort ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 250 (1979).
According to another source: "Marshall's sixty-page concurrence in the Furman
result was a masterly product of exhaustive, painstaking research. He wrote most of it
himself, trusting little of it to his clerks. Many court observers regard it as the finest opinion
he produced during his years on the Court." DAVIS & CLARK, supra note 8, at 323.
13. Although it would later be clear that Justice Brennan had done the same, that was
not so clear in his Furman concurrence. See Gerald T. McFadden, Capital SentencingEffect of McGautha and Furman, 45 TEMP. L. REV. 619, 622 (1972) (suggesting that
Brennan might approve of mandatory capital punishment schemes).
14. Furman,408 U.S. at 316-22 (Marshall, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 322-28.
16. Id. at 329.
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concurrence discerned four additional principles.' 7 First, punishments that
involve too much physical pain and suffering are prohibited. Second,
previously unknown punishments are permissible if they are no more cruel
than the ones they superseded. Third, a penalty may be cruel and unusual
because it is excessive and serves no valid legislative purpose. Fourth, even
if a penalty is not excessive and serves a valid legislative purpose, it may be
prohibited if popular sentiment is against it.
Justice Marshall next reviewed how the death penalty had been
historically applied in the United States. 8 He noted that capital punishment
was brought to this country but its use was tempered considerably, through
the reduction in the number of capital crimes, replacement of mandatory
death sentences with jury discretion as to the punishment, and the
development of progressively more humane methods of execution. 9 In
light of this, he wondered "whether American society has reached a point
where abolition is not dependent on a successful grass roots movement in
particular jurisdictions, but is demanded by the Eighth Amendment." 20 He
noted, however, that "the Eighth Amendment is our insulation from our
baser selves. The 'cruel and unusual' language limits the avenues through
which vengeance can be channeled." 2' To determine whether the death
penalty was excessive, Justice Marshall assessed each of the penological
rationales and policies-retribution, deterrence, prevention of recidivism,
encouragement of guilty pleas and confessions, eugenics, and economyconceivably offered in support of capital punishment.2 2 Finding little
support for any proffered rationale, Justice Marshall concluded that the
death penalty was excessive and unnecessary punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. 23
The concurrence then turned predictive.24 Even if the death penalty was
not excessive, he opined, it violated the Eighth Amendment because "it is
morally unacceptable to the people of the United States at this time in their
history."25 In his view, the question of capital punishment was not to be
decided by public opinion polls indicating public acceptance or rejection

17. Id. at 331-32.
18. Id. at 333-42.
19. Id. at 341.
20. Id. at 341-42.
21. Id. at 345.
22. Id. at 342-59.
23. Id. at 359.
24. See N. Douglas Wells, Justice Thurgood Marshall: "Prophet With Honor," 22
CAP. U. L. REv. 561, 566, 569-70 (1993) (describing Marshall's judicial philosophy as one
based on sociological jurisprudence, which included considering the impact a court decision
had on the quality and fabric of society).
25. Furman,428 U.S. at 360.
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because whether or not a punishment is cruel and unusual depends, not on
whether its mere mention 'shocks the conscience and sense of justice of
the people,' but on whether people who were fully informed as to the
purposes of the penalty and its liabilities would find the penalty shocking,
unjust, and unacceptable.
He did not insist that the public had to act rationally. They could vote
based on their "subjective, emotional reactions [as] informed citizens."27
Justice Marshall reasoned that if the public knew more about the operation
of capital punishment, the average citizen would conclude that it was an
unwise policy and morally reprehensible.
Viewing retribution as the main justification for the death penalty, he
postulated, "I cannot believe that at this stage in our history, the American
people would ever knowingly support purposeless vengeance. Thus, I
believe that the great mass of citizens would conclude on the basis of the
material already considered that the death penalty is immoral and therefore
unconstitutional." 29 After again describing how the death penalty had been
unequally imposed in this country, he concluded, "Assuming knowledge of
all the facts presently available regarding capital punishment, the average
citizen would, in my opinion, find it shocking to his conscience and sense
ofjustice. For this reason alone capital punishment cannot stand.' 30
B. JusticeMarshall'sGregg Dissent

Furman was hardly the end of the story. Thirty-five states and Congress
redrafted their death penalty laws after Furman.Four years later in Gregg v.
Georgia,3 ' and in two other cases, 32 the Court, by 7-2 votes, ruled that the

26.

Id. at 361 (quoting United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583,608 (2d Cir. 1952)).

27.

Id. at 362.

28.

According to Justice Marshall, the public should be informed

that the death penalty is no more effective deterrent than life imprisonment, that
convicted murderers are rarely executed, but are usually sentenced to a term in
prison; that convicted murderers usually are model prisoners, and that they almost
always become law-abiding citizens upon their release from prison; that the costs
of executing a capital offender exceed the costs of imprisoning him for life; that
while in prison, a convict under sentence of death performs none of the useful
functions that life prisoners perform; that no attempt is made in the sentencing
process to ferret out likely recidivists for execution; and that the death penalty may
actually stimulate criminal activity.
Id. at 362-63.
29. Id. at 363.
30. Id. at 369.
31. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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death penalty did not invariably violate the Eighth Amendment, and
concluded that the amended statutes had addressed the concerns identified
in Furman.
Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan dissented. In his dissent, Justice
Marshall assessed the co ency of his hypothesis in light of the rewritten
capital punishment laws.3 He interpreted a then-recent study as confirming
his sentiment "that the American people know little about the death penalty,
and that the opinions of an informed public would differ significantly from
those of a public unaware of the consequences and effects of the death
penalty."3
Justice Marshall then noted that in Gregg a majority of the Court had
concluded that general deterrence and retribution were the two justifications
that supported the death penalty. Notwithstanding the promulgation of a
then-recent academic study intimating that the death penalty was a general
deterrent to crime," Justice Marshall remained unconvinced. As to
retribution, Justice Marshall noted that it was a multifaceted concept, and
he, therefore, divided the concept into different strands. The first strand
encapsulated the idea that those who break the law deserve punishment. He
then responded to the Court's reasoning, which endorsed the retributive
value of capital punishment.
The foregoing contentions-that society's expression of moral outrage
through the imposition of the death penalty pre-empts the citizenry from
taking the law into its own hands and reinforces moral values-are not
retributive in the purest sense. They are essentially utilitarian in that they
portray the death penalty as valuable because of its beneficial results.
These justifications for the death penalty are inadequate because the
penalty is, quite clearly I think, not necessary to the accomplishment of
those results.
Justice Marshall next addressed another strand of retribution-the
contention that "the taking of the murderer's life is itself morally good."

32. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding Florida's capital
punishment scheme); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding Texas's capital
punishment scheme).
33. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 231-33 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 232 (discussing Austin Sarat & Neil Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death
Penalty, and The Eighth Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 Wis. L. REV.

171).
35. Id. at 234 (citing I. Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A
Question ofLife and Death, 65 AM. EcoN. REv. 397 (1975)).

36. Id. at 238-39.
37. Id. at 239. Commentators are thus wrong to claim that Justice Marshall did not
fully appreciate the different variants of retribution. Cf Carol S. Steiker, The Marshall
Hypothesis Revisited, 52 How. L.J. 525, 526, 528-29 (2009); Jordan Steiker, The Long Road

AARONS

2013]

389

He noted that the Gregg plurality opinion had declared that "the Eighth
Amendment demands more than that a challenged punishment be
acceptable to contemporary society."38 According to the plurality, the
punishment also had to conform "with the basic concept of human dignity,"
and the rationale for imposing punishment has to be consistent "with our
respect for the dignity of [other] men."39 Taking a person's life because he
"deserves it" was, in his view, the denial of the wrongdoer's dignity and
worth. Justice Marshall concluded that the death penalty was unnecessary
to promote deterrence or "any legitimate notion of retribution" and was
therefore an excessive penalty forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. 4 0 His
Gregg dissent represented an unbowed and equally convinced approach to
the issue.
C. The Faith of an Abolitionist
Justice Marshall's Furman concurrence evidences an unfailing belief in
the "American public." He believed that public support of the death penalty
rested on several false premises, and that once these false premises were
exposed, a fully informed public would reject capital punishment.
Furthermore, his understanding of the Eighth Amendment as a limitation
against "our baser selves" ensured that authorized punishments must be
humane, as defined by contemporary standards.4 1
Even after Gregg, Justice Marshall continued to hold onto his beliefs,
though it was the worst of times for death penalty abolitionists. It is worth
remembering that his Gregg concurrence was written as a coda to the just

Up From Barbarism: Thurgood Marshall and the Death Penalty, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1131,

1144-45 (1993).
38. Gregg, 408 U.S. at 240 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
39.

Id.

40. Id. at 240-41.
41. Years later, Justice Blackmun expressed a similar hope when he concluded that
the death penalty could not be imposed within the parameters of the Constitution:
Perhaps one day this Court will develop procedural rules or verbal formulas that
actually will provide consistency, fairness, and reliability in a capital sentencing
scheme. I am not optimistic that such a day will come. I am more optimistic,
though, that this Court eventually will conclude that the effort to eliminate
arbitrariness while preserving fairness "in the infliction of [death] is so plainly
doomed to failure that it-and the death penalty-must be abandoned altogether."
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420, 442 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in
judgment). I may not live to see that day, but I have faith that eventually it will
arrive. The path the Court has chosen lessens us all ....

Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1159 (1994).
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failed arduous and incremental litigation campain to have the Supreme
Court declare capital punishment unconstitutional.
Justice Marshall had to note that a key player in the capital litigation
campaign was the NAACP LDF, the organization that he served as
Director-Counsel during its more successful efforts to desegregate
schools. 3 A decade after Gregg, Jack Greenburg, Justice Marshall's
successor at the NAACP LDF, which continues to litigate major capital
cases, repeated Justice Marshall's observations on the public's
misperceptions on the death penalty:
Death penalty proponents have assumed a system of capital punishment
that simply does not exist: a system in which the penalty is inflicted on the
most reprehensible criminals and meted out frequently enough both to
deter and to perform the moral and utilitarian functions ascribed to
retribution. Explicitly or implicitly, they assume a system in which
certainly the worst criminals .. . are executed in an even-handed manner.
But this idealized system is not the American system of capital
punishment ....
Indeed, the reality of American capital punishment is quite to the
contrary. Since at least 1967, the death penalty has been inflicted only
rarely, erratically, and often upon the least odious killers, while many of
the most heinous criminals have escaped execution. Moreover, it has been
employed almost exclusively in a few formerly slave holding states, and
there it has been used almost exclusively against killers of whites, not

42. See generally MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME
COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1974) (chronicling the NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund's (LDF) efforts from 1961 through 1972 to have the United States Supreme
Court declare capital punishment unconstitutional); Eric L Muller, The Legal Defense
Fund's CapitalPunishment Campaign: The Distorting Influence of Death, 4 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 158 (1985) (reviewing the NAACP LDF, its death penalty campaign, the
problems the campaign faced and comparing the anti-death penalty effort with the earlier
struggle to desegregate public education). See also BARRETT J. FOERSTER, RACE, RAPE,
AND INJUSTICE: DOCUMENTING AND CHALLENGING DEATH PENALTY CASES IN THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ERA (2012) (recollections of one of 28 law students who, in the summer of 1965,

assisted in collecting data on southern rape cases, seeking to prove that the death penalty was
applied in a racially discriminatory manner during the previous 20 years).
43. See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD
MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 (1994) (chronicling Thurgood
Marshall's involvement with and leadership of the NAACP LDF); MARK V. TUSHNET,
THE NAACP LDF's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION 1925-1950
(1987) (history of the NAACP LDF's legal campaign against segregated public schools
which led up to the U.S. Supreme Court declaring the practice unconstitutional). See also
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION

AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976) (recounting the history of racial
segregation in the United States and the litigation efforts lead primarily by the NAACP LDF
to challenge and overturn de jure segregation in public education).
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blacks. It is this system, not some idealized one, that must be defended in
any national debate on the death penalty . . . .
Justice Marshall's hypothesis and his persistent effort to ensure human
dignity to those on the lowest rungs of our society's social ladder are
reminiscent of the attitude of slavery abolitionists. For example, while this
country wrestled with whether to continue the enslavement of African
Americans and whether to stop the spread of slavery, Unitarian minister
Theodore Parker sermonized:
Look at the facts of the world. You see a continual and progressive
triumph of the right. Ido not pretend to understand the moral universe; the
arc is a long one, my eye reaches but little ways; I cannot calculate the
curve and complete the figure by the experience of sight; I can divine it by
conscience. And from what I see I am sure it bends towards justice.
Things refuse to be mismanaged long. Jefferson trembled when he thought
of slavery and remembered that God is just. Ere long all America will
tremble ....

Stated simply, like his abolitionist predecessors, Justice Marshall in
Furman and Gregg appeals to a higher law and an equitable order. Though
representative democracy generally prevails in this country, Justice
Marshall in Furman and Gregg refused to defer to the public's choice, if
what the public wanted was either based on inaccuracies or resulted in the
constitutionally impermissible treatment of others.
III. TESTS OF THE MARSHALL HYPOTHESIS

Social scientists have repeatedly tested some of the Supreme Court's
assertions regarding the death penalty. For instance, in Gregg, the Court
recognized the main social purposes for the death penalty as retribution and
deterrence of prospective capital offenders." Social science research
suggests that public support for the death penalty is not so easily
categorized. In response to social scientists' questions, death penalty
supporters proffer both utilitarian and retributive rationales for the penalty,
while opponents of the death penalty proffer largely utilitarian justifications
for its elimination.47 Furthermore, when asked to select between deterrence

44.

Jack Greenberg, Against the American System of Capital Punishment,99 HARv.

L. REv. 1670, 1670 (1986).
45. 2 THEODORE PARKER, Of Justice and the Conscience, in THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF THEODORE PARKER: SERMONS- PRAYERS 37, 48 (Frances Powers Cobbe ed., 1879).
46. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
47. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Lee Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A
Close Examination of the Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists, 29 CRIME & DELINQ.
116, 149-57 (1983).
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and retribution as the reason for the death penalty, about 63% of supporters
select deterrence.48 When informed that no reliable studies have established
that the death penalty deters, support for the death penalty falls to 55%, and
to 43% if life without parole is a sentencing option.49 Nonetheless, a
segment of the population embraces the death penalty as a retributive
sanction.50 In short, death penalty support appears to be broadapproaching a supermajority of public endorsement-and wide-that is, for
a variety of reasons. Yet, on closer examination, the death penalty is
strongly embraced by fewer persons than may initially appear and more for
its symbolism as a punishment than for its effectiveness as a crime control
tool.,,
Social scientists have also tested Justice Marshall's hypothesis. Morie
than twenty published articles describe experiments52 and their results.5 3

48. Tom R. Tyler & Renee Weber, Support for the Death Penalty: Instrumental
Response to Crime, or Symbolic Attitude?, 17 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 21, 24 (1982).
49. Hans Ziezel & Alec M. Gallop, Death PenaltySentiment in the UnitedStates, 5 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 285, 290 (1989); see also Neil Vidmar & Phoebe Ellsworth,
Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1245, 1257 (1974) (reporting 54%

support for the death penalty even if it were proven not to be a deterrent to crime).
50. It remains unclear what variant(s) of retribution these supporters endorse. See
Robert M. Bohm, Retribution and CapitalPunishment: Toward a Better Understandingof
Death Penalty Opinion, 20 J. CRIM. JUST. 227, 234 (1992) (identifying eight different

meanings of retribution and reporting that vindictive revenge and revenge-utilitarian are the
most popular); James 0. Finckenauer, Public Supportfor Death Penalty: Retributionas Just
Deserts or Retribution as Revenge, 5 JUST. Q. 81 (1988) (exploring whether retributivebased support for capital punishment is based on just deserts or revenge).
51. Ellsworth & Ross, supra note 47, at 162-65.
52. See, e.g., Cedric Michel & John K. Cochran, The Effects of Information on
Change in Death Penalty Support: Race- and Gender-Specific Extensions of the Marshall
Hypotheses, 9 J. ETHNIcITY CRIM. JUST. 291 (2011); Deniese Kennedy-Kollar & Evan J.
Mandery, Testing the Marshall Hypothesis and its Antithesis: The Effect of Biased
Information on Death-PenaltyOpinion, 23 CRIM. JUST. STUD. 65 (2010); Robert M. Bohm,
The Effects of Classroom Instruction and Discussion on Death Penalty Opinions: A
Teaching Note, 17 J. CRIM. JUST. 123 (1989); Robert Bohm, Death Penalty Opinions: A
Classroom Experience and Public Commitment, 60 Soc. INQUIRY 285 (1990); Robert M.
Bohm, Louise J. Clark, & Adrian F. Aveni, The Influence of Knowledge on Reasonsfor
Death Penalty Opinions: An Experimental Test, 7 JUST. Q. 175 (1990); Robert M. Bohm &
Ronald E. Vogel, Educational Experiences and Death Penalty Opinions: Stimuli that
Produce Changes, 2 J. CRIM. JUST. EDUC. 69 (1991); Robert M. Bohm & Ronald E. Vogel,
A Comparison of Factors Associated with Uninformed and Informed Death Penalty
Opinions, 22 J. CRIM. JUST. 125 (1994); Robert M. Bohm & Brenda L. Vogel, More Than
Ten Years After: The Long-Term Stability of Informed Death Penalty Opinions, 32 J. CRIM.
JUST. 307 (2004); Robert M. Bohm, Louise J. Clark, & Adrian F. Aveni, Knowledge and
Death Penalty Opinion: A Test of the Marshall Hypotheses, 28 CRIME AND DELINQ. 360
(1991); A.W. Clarke, E. Lambert, & L.A. Whitt, Executing the Innocent: The Next Step in
the Marshall Hypothesis, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 309 (2000-01); John K.
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These studies generally indicate that supporters of the death penalty have
some knowledge about the way the penalty has been applied, but are
uninformed on whether it is a deterrent.54 Once informed that capital
punishment is not a deterrent5 and of its unequal administration, support
for the sanction falls among those who moderately support the penalty.s6
The more knowledgeable a person is about the death penalty before the
study, the less likely it is that information on the operation of capital
punishment will change that person's views. 7

Cochran, Beth Sanders & Mitchell B. Chamlin, Profiles in Change: An Alternative Look at
the Marshall Hypotheses, 17 J. CRIM. JUST. EDUC. 205 (2006); John K. Cochran & Mitchell
B. Chamlin, Can Information Change Public Opinion? Another Test of the Marshall
Hypothesis 33 J. CRIM. JUST. 573 (2005); Ellsworth & Ross, supra note 47; Eric Lambert &
Alan Clarke, The Impact ofInformation on an Individual's Support of the Death Penalty: A
Partial Test of the Marshall Hypothesis Among College Students, 12 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y
REV. 215 (2001); D. R. LONGMIRE, AMERICANS'

ATTITUDES ABOUT THE ULTIMATE

WEAPON, IN AMERICANS VIEW CRIME AND JUSTICE: A NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINIoN
SURVEY 93 (T.J. Flanagan & D.R. Longmire eds., 1996); Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross &
Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior
Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 2098
(1979); Allan L. Patenaude, "May God Have Mercy on Your Soul!" Exploring and Teaching
a Course on the Death Penalty, 12 J. CRIM. JUST. EDUC. 405 (2001); M. Sandys, Attitudinal
Change Among Students in a Capital Punishment Class: It May be Possible, 20 AM. J.
CRIM. JUST. 37 (1995); Sarat & Vidmar, supra note 34; Neil Vidmar & Tony Dittenhoffer,
Informed Public Opinion and Death Penalty Attitudes, 23 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 43
(1981); D. Weinstock & G. Schwartz, Executing the Innocent: Preventing the Ultimate
Injustice 34 CRIM. L. BULL. 328 (1998); Harold 0. Wright, Jr., Robert Bohm, & Katherine
M. Jamieson, A Comparison of Uninformed and Informed Death Penalty Opinions: A
Replication and Expansion 20 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 57 (1995); Hans Zeisel & A. Gallup
Death Penalty Sentiment in the United States, 5 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 285

(1989).
53.

The subjects of these studies have typically been college and university students

in the United States. Canadian students also reflected a substantial decline in support for the

death penalty after being exposed to deterrence, moral, and judicial administration issues.
See Vidmar & Dittenhoffer, supra note 52, at 53.
54. Sarat & Vidmar, supra note 34, at 187.
55. At least since 1976, researchers have studied whether the death penalty is a
deterrent to murder or other crimes. The overwhelming weight of the research is that the

death penalty is not a deterrent. See John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of
Empirical Evidence in Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2005) (summarizing

debate, considering most recent deterrence studies, and expressing profound uncertainty
regarding any deterrent effect).
56.

Sarat & Vidmar, supra note 34, at 188-91, 195-97.

57.

Eric G. Lambert, Scott D. Camp, Alan Clarke, & Shanhe Jiang, The Impact of

Information on Death Penalty Support, Revisited, 57 CRIME & DELINQ. 572, 590 (2011).
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Robert Bohm has run several studies on the issue.58 His most
comprehensive study was in 1991, with other researchers.s9 It concluded
that the public lacks general knowledge about the death penalty and its
administration;60 that upon being informed about the operation of the death
penalty, there is a decline in support for the penalty; but the amount of
decline was related to the amount of prior knowledge the person had about
the death penalty.6' Furthermore, some death penalty opinions will not
change, regardless of the quantity and quality of information on its
operation, because humans process new data, on a subject like the death
penalty in accordance with their previously held views. In fact, there is a
greater likelihood of polarization and hardening of a person's opinions on
capital punishment when presented with information beyond its operation.63
Along the same line, research suggests that after being informed about the
death penalty, once people declare their public support for the sanction,
they tend not to revisit that decision, despite evidence of the unfairness and

58. In 1989, he noted that compared with the beginning of the course, 26% of the
students inhis death penalty class expressed a reduction of support for capital punishment at
the end of the class. Bohm, supranote 52, at 130.
In a 1991 study, Bohm observed a small decrease in support for the death penalty
in students who took a death penalty class, but not among those who took a non-death
penalty class. Robert M. Bohm, Louise J. Clark, & Adrian F. Aveni, The Influence of
Knowledge on Reasonsfor Death Penalty Opinions:An Experimental Test, 7 JUST. Q. 175,
175 (1990); Robert M. Bohm & Ronald E. Vogel, Educational Experiences and Death
Penalty Opinions:Stimuli that Produce Changes, 2 J. CRIM. JUST. EDUC. 69, 77-79 (1991)

(confirming earlier research on information that tended to change students' death penalty
opinions).
A few years later, an expanded study with other authors again noted a decline in
death penalty support among students. See Harold 0. Wright Jr., Robert M. Bohm, &
Katherine M Jamieson, A Comparison of Uninformed and Informed Death Penalty
Opinions:A Replicationand Expansion, 20 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 57 (1995).

59.

Robert M. Bohm, Louise J. Clark & Adrian F. Aveni, Knowledge and Death

Penalty Opinion:A Test of the MarshallHypothesis, 28 CRIME & DELINQ. 360 (1991).

60. Id. at 369-73.
61. Id. at 377.
62. See generally Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross, & Mark R. Lepper, BiasedAssimilation
and Attitude Polarization: The Effect of Prior Theories and Subsequently Considered
Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2105-08 (1979).

Bohm and his co-authors attributed the lack of influence that information on the
death penalty had on some to "biased assimilation," that is, processing new information so
that it is in accordance with previously held views. See Robert M. Bohm, Louise J. Clark, &
Adrian F. Aveni, The Influence of Knowledge on Reasonsfor Death Penalty Opinions: An

Experimental Test, 7 JUST. Q. 175, 183-84 (1990). The biased assimilation concept has also
been labeled as cognitive dissonance. See Robert M. Bohm & Ronald E. Vogel, Educational
Experiences and Death Penalty Opinions: Stimuli that Produce Changes, 2 J. CRIM. JUST.

EDUC. 69, 141 (1991).
63. See Lord, Ross, & Lepper, supra note 62, at 2105-08.
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fallibility of the punishment." Bohm's studies replicate the conclusions of
other experiments and Bohm's work has been confirmed in subsequent
studies.'
Empirical research indicates that members of different social groups are
influenced differently by the same information on capital punishment.
White and older respondents are more likely to support the death penalty
than non-white and younger persons." Women do not favor the death
penalty as much as men, poorer people favor the death penalty less
frequently than the more affluent, and Democrats and Independents are less
in favor of the penalty in comparison to Republicans.67 Notwithstanding the
apparent change of views about the death penalty in some participants, at
some level death penalty support is less about empirical proof on the utility
of capital punishment and more about a person's worldview or the
sentiment attached to using criminal law to address social problems.

64. Robert M. Bohm, Death Penalty Opinions: A Classroom Experience and Public
Commitment, 60 Soc. INQUIRY 285, 295 (1990).

65. For example, a 1995 study concluded that support for the death penalty dropped
from 56% to 22% after students took a course on the subject, while opposition rose from
35% to 65%. Sandys, supra note 52, at 45. A 2001 study found a statistically significant
drop in support for the death penalty among students exposed to materials that showed the
lack of deterrence and the possibility of executing innocent persons. Lambert & Clarke,
supra note 52, at 228; see also Cochran, Sanders, & Chamlin, supra note 52 (reporting the
results of informing students of death penalty data in ten different classes); Lambert, Camp,
Clarke, & Jiang, supra note 57, at 589 (reporting decline in support for death penalty among
people exposed to information on its lack of deterrence and the possibility of executing an
innocent person). But see Kennedy-Kollar & Mandery, supra note 52, at 80-82 (reporting
increase in support for death penalty among death penalty supporters after receiving data on
its administration). See also supranote 52 and accompanying text.
66. Lambert, Camp, Clarke, & Jiang, supra note 57, at 589-90; Ziesel & Gallop,
supra note 49, at 294.
Several studies have detected the chasm of death penalty support between races.
See, e.g., David N. Baker, Eric G. Lambert & Morris Jenkins, Racial Differences in Death
Penalty Support and Opposition:A PreliminaryStudy of White and Black College Students,
35 J. BLACK STUD. 201 (2005); John K. Cochran & Mitchell B. Chamlin, The Enduring
Racial Divide in Death Penalty Support, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 85 (2006); Jon Hurwitz & Mark
Peffley, Explaining the Great RacialDivide: Perceptionsof Fairness in the US. Criminal

Justice System, 67 J. POL. 762 (2005); Michel & Cochran, supra note 52; James D. Unnever
& Francis T. Cullen, The Racial Divide in Support for the Death Penalty: Does White
Racism Matter?, 85 Soc. FORCES 1281 (2007).

67. Ziesel & Gallop, supra note 49, at 294; Lambert, Camp, Clarke, & Jiang, supra
note 57, at 589-90.
68. See Ziesel & Gallop, supra note 49, at 295. Bohm et al. labeled this biased
assimilation. See Robert M. Bohm, Louise J. Clark, & Adrian F. Aveni, The Influence of
Knowledge on Reasonsfor Death Penalty Opinions: An Experimental Test, 7 JuST.

Q.

175,

183-84 (1990); Scott Vollum & Jacqueline Buffington-Vollum, An Examination of SocialPsychological Factors and Support for the Death Penalty: Attribution, Moral
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Finally, the studies have explored the impact that the data has on death
penalty views. Exposure to information on the death penalty does not have
significant long-term influence on a person's views of capital punishment.
Accordingly, three years after first exposure to data on the death penalty,
most people return to their pre-exposure views of capital punishment.7 0
IV. LIVING OUT THE MARSHALL HYPOTHESIS ON THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

While social scientists were conducting these experiments, the Justices
on the United States Supreme Court were deciding capital cases. Three of
Justice Marshall's colleagues-Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr., Justice Harry A.
Blackmun, and Justice John Paul Stevens-were living out what the social
science experiments suggested.
A. The Content of CapitalPunishmentJurisprudence
When the Court first started to subject the death penalty to federal
constitutional regulation-usually under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause-it endeavored to ensure that the criminological views
of its members would not override legitimate legislative determinations. To
do so, the Court intimated that it would rely on social and empirical data in
constructing the parameters of the death penalty.'
By 1986, ten years into the process, the Court had resolved many
important issues.72 The Court, however, had generally ignored the logical
implications of relevant empirical research, instead basing its decisions on
the legal reasoning of its members--shorn of the influence of empiricism
and social science. This meant that the personal views of the Justices
would play a role in the Court's determination of the law, perhaps more
than in non-capital cases.

Disengagement, and the Value-Expressive Function of Attitudes, 35 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 15,

30-32 (2010).

69. Robert M. Bohm & Brenda L. Vogel, More than Ten Years After: The Long-Term
Stability ofinformed Death Penalty Opinions,32 J. CRIM. JUST. 307, 307, 325 (2004).

70. Id.; Sandys, supra note 52, at 47-48 (1995) (reporting continued attitude change
one year after exposure to death penalty data).
71. James R. Acker, Different Agenda: The Supreme Court, Empirical Research
Evidence, and CapitalPunishmentDecisions, 1986-1989,27 L. & Soc. REV. 65, 66 (1993).

72. Id. at 67.
73. Id.
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B. Justice HarryA. Blacianun
During the 1968 presidential campaign, Richard Nixon promised to
appoint to the bench experienced judges who interpreted the 4Constitution
and federal law narrowly and were judicially conservative. Harry A.
Blackmun, a Nixon appointee, who joined the Supreme Court in June 1970,
fit that bill. Immediately before his appointment, Blackmun served eleven
years as a federal appellate judge.7 s During that6 tenure he decided four
capital cases. In one opinion, Maxwell v. Bishop,7 Blackmun wrote that the
decisional process was
particularly excruciating for the author of this opinion who is not
personally convinced of the rightness of capital punishment and who
questions it as an effective deterrent. But the advisability of capital
punishment is a policy matter ordinarily to be resolved by the legislature
or through executive clemency and not by the judiciary.
During his one-day confirmation hearing, Blackmun stated that he
personally thought that the death penalty should be abolished and that as a
legislator he would vote to repeal it. He promised, as a judge, to follow the
legislature's directives, in all but the rarest of cases.
Justice Blackmun proved true to his words. In his first years on the
Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun was a reliably conservative justice.'7
where he again
Notably, in 1972, he was one of the dissenters in Furman,
wrote of his personal disapproval of capital punishment.80 Justice Blackmun
"personally ... rejoice[d]" at the Court's result, but he faulted the Court for
overstepping its institutional role.8 ' Four years later, Justice Blackmun was
in the majority in Gregg, which held that the death penalty did not
invariably violate the Eighth Amendment. From the mid-1970s, Justice
Blackmun adopted more moderate judicial positions, more frequently
voting in favor of criminal defendants in non-capital cases; by the mid1980s he voted even more often in favor of the criminal defendant in non-

74. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 9-10 (rev. ed.

1999).
75. Id. at 258.
76. 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968), rev'd on different grounds, 398 U.S. 262 (1970).
77. Maxwell, 398 F.2d at 153-54 n.11.
78. Hearingon the Nomination of HarryA. Blackmun, of Minnesota, to be Associate
Justice ofthe Supreme Court ofthe United States, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 59-60 (1970).
79. ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at 260.

80.
81.

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405-07 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 414.
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capital cases, and most frequently to limit the application of the death
penalty.82
Justice Blackmun had a tendency to include personal professions in his
judicial opinions. 3 Despite filing more dissents in capital cases later in his
tenure, Justice Blackmun rarely criticized the path of the Court's
jurisprudence.84 Thus, his dissent from the denial of certiorari in
Callins v. Collins,"s on February 22, 1994, was surprising. 6 In Callins,
Justice Blackmun declared:
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of
death. For more than 20 years I have endeavored-indeed, I have
struggled-along with a majority of this Court, to develop procedural and
substantive rules that would lend more than the mere appearance of
fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather than continue to coddle the
Court's delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved and
the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectuall
obligated simply to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed.
Justice Blackmun explained that he accepted that capital punishment
must be administered consistently and rationally.88 He concluded that the
discretion that was necessary and inherent in the capital punishment process
proved to be its undoing,89 and the issue of race only exacerbated how that
discretion was exercised.9 0 Justice Blackmun did not believe that the
conflicting constitutional commands-of insisting on procedural rules and

82. ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at 260-61.
83. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 943 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Furman, 408 U.S. at 405-07
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
84. The closest examples were passing references in Herrerav. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,
446 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) and Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 358 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). For summaries of Justice Blackmun's capital
jurisprudence, see Randall Coyne, Marking the Progress of a Humane Justice: Harry
Blackmun's Death Penalty Epiphany, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 367 (1995); D. Grier Stephenson,
Jr., Justice Blackmun's Eighth Amendment Pilgrimage, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 271 (1994);
Malcolm L. Stewart, Justice Blackmun's Capital Punishment Jurisprudence, 26 HAST.
CONST. L.Q. 271 (1998).
85. 510 U.S. 1141 (1994).
86. Starting in 1992, Justice Blackmun and his law clerks searched for a case in which
he could announce his changed views on capital punishment. Martha Dragich Pearson,
Revelations from the Blackmun Papers on the Development of Death Penalty Law,

70 Mo. L. REV. 1183, 1195-98 (2005).
87. Callins, 510 U.S. at 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
88. Id. at 1147.
89. Id. at 1147-53.
90. Id. at 1153-55.
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objective standards that minimized the risk of arbitrary death sentences
while maintaining individualized sentencing of defendants-could be
reconciled.91 Furthermore, the Court's jurisprudence had "retreated" from
its earlier commitment to satisfying both commands.Y Justice Blackmun
also noted that the federal courts' power to address claims of constitutional
error in capital cases had, since Gregg, been circumscribed by the Court.
Accordingly, he concluded that the death penalty as currently administered
was unconstitutional."
Justice Blackmun's legal legacy is as a judge concerned with the
implications of his decisions. His judicial philosophy changed along with
the membership of the Court, resulting in Justice Blackmun's being
perceived as more liberal over the years and his voting more frequently
with his more liberal colleagues. Furthermore, during his tenure the Court's
membership changed as more conservative Justices replaced moderate or
liberal ones. Justice Blackmun's view of his role as a member of the high
court changed, too; at the end of his tenure, he was more comfortable
relying on and disclosing his personal views and reconsidering his
previously held views in light of new knowledge and experiences.
C. JusticeLewis F. Powell,Jr.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. was another Nixon appointee. He joined the
Supreme Court in January 1972. Like Justice Blackmun, Justice Powell was
selected because of his perceived conservative judicial philosophy. Unlike
Justice Blackmun, Justice Powell did not have prior judicial experience.
Powell was, however, a well-respected lawyer in private practice, who had
served in several public service positions, including as president of the

91.

Id. at 1155-56.

92.

Id. at 1156.

Id. at 1157-59.
Id. at 1159.
ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at 261; William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice
Harry A. Blackmun, 108 HARV. L. REV. I (1994); Stephen Breyer, In Memoriam: Harry A.
Blackmun, 113 HARV. L REV. 1 (1999); Harold Hongju Koh, Justice Blackmun and the
"World Out There," 104 YALE L.J. 23 (1994).
96. When Justice Blaclamun became a Justice, he joined Chief Justice Warren Burger,
Justices Hugo Black, William Douglas, John Marshall Harlan II, William Brennan, Potter
Stewart, Byron White, and Thurgood Marshall. During Justice Blackmun's service, Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., succeeded Justice Black, Justice William Rehnquist succeeded Justice
Harlan, Justice John Paul Stevens succeeded Justice Douglas, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
succeeded Justice Stewart, Justice Antonin Scalia succeeded Justice Rehnquist upon the
latter's elevation to Chief Justice, Justice Anthony Kennedy succeeded Justice Powell,
Justice David Souter succeeded Justice Brennan, Justice Clarence Thomas succeeded Justice
Marshall and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg succeeded Justice White.
93.
94.
95.

400

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:381

American Bar Association. When he joined the Court Justice Powell did
not have a firm view on capital punishment, and likely had done little
serious thinking about the issue.98
Furman was one of the first cases Justice Powell heard.99 He dissented
from the Court's ruling in that case that the death penalty was
unconstitutional. To him, capital punishment was authorized by the text of
the Constitution, and had been practiced since the nation's founding, and
the Court's precedents had presumed its constitutionality.'"' It was the role
of the legislatures, not the courts, to remedy any defects in the death
penalty. 0 Justice Powell also criticized his colleague's willingness to rely
on "speculative assumptions" in ruling the death penalty unconstitutional.' 02
He briefly responded to Justice Marshall's hypothesis that the fully
informed public would reject the discriminatory application of the death
penalty. 03 According to Justice Powell, capital punishment might be
accepted because of its infrequent and uneven application or out of
ignorance as to its implementation."
Four years later, the Court again considered the constitutionality of
capital punishment.'05 At that time, Justice Powell joined Justice Potter
Stewart and Justice John Paul Stevens to co-author controlling plurality
opinions in the five cases before the Court.'" The approaches taken by
Georgia, Florida, and Texas were deemed constitutional, while the laws of
North Carolina and Louisiana were not.' 07 The trio's approach announced

97. ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at 263-64.
98. JEFFRIES, supra note 4, at 408.
99. Days before oral argument, Justice Marshall paid a courtesy call on his new
colleague on his first day as a justice and jokingly asked Justice Powell, "Do you have your
capital punishment opinion written yet?" After Powell responded no, Justice Marshall said,
"Well, I wish you luck. My wife Cissy is after me, and thinks we should string them all up.
But, you'll see what I've written." He left with a chuckle. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG,
supra note 12, at 241-42.
100. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 417-28 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 431-33.
102. Id. at 444.
103.

Id. at 446-47.

104. Id. at 446-47.
105. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 158 (1976) ("The issue in this case is
whether the imposition of the sentence of death for the crime of murder under the law of
Georgia violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.").
106. See id. (plurality opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 244 (1976) (plurality opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell and
Stevens); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 264 (1976) (plurality opinion of Justices Stewart,
Powell and Stevens); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 282 (1976) (plurality
opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 327
(1976) (plurality opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens).
107. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207 (concluding that Georgia's capital sentencing statutory
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twin commands that they stated were required by the Constitution.los First,
so long as a jurisdiction's death penalty laws and procedures provided
guidance for the exercise of the choice of whether to seek or impose the
death penalty, the laws were valid. Second, even after a defendant was
found guilty, death penalty laws had to provide for an individualized
assessment by the sentencer on whether to impose a death sentence on that
defendant.
Justice Powell thereafter endeavored to apply the principles announced
in the 1976 cases. Perceived as the Court's conscience, Justice Powell was
in the majority more often than any of his colleagues in death penalty
cases.'" Notwithstanding the Court's 1976 decisions, executions did not
become regular events. In 1983, noting that a number of state capital cases
were nearing the end of federal habeas review, in Barefoot v. Estelle,"o the
Court outlined the procedures for the federal courts to use in decidin
whether to stay an execution and for appeals from the denial of stays.
Notwithstanding Barefoot, the number of inmates on death row continued
to rise because more defendants were being sentenced to death than were
being executed or otherwise removed from death row.
According to Justice Powell, and other members of the Court, capital
defense lawyers were part of the reason for the rising death row population
because they exploited the legal process, including filing last minute
appeals to the Supreme Court." Under Supreme Court practice, four votes

scheme did not violate the Constitution); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 259-60 (concluding that
Florida's capital sentencing system served to assure that death sentences would not be
"wantonly" or "freakishly" imposed); Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276 (concluding that Texas's
capital sentencing laws and procedures did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (declaring North Carolina's mandatory death
penalty law unconstitutional); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336 (declaring Louisiana's mandatory
death penalty law unconstitutional).
108. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 ("whether a human life should be taken or spared, [the
sentencer's] discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of
wholly arbitrary and capricious action"); id. at 195 (to ensure that the death penalty is not
"imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that
ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance"); id. at
197 ("No longer can a [capital] jury ... reach a finding of the defendant's guilt and then,
without guidance or direction, decide whether he should live or die. Instead, the jury's
attention is directed to the specific circumstances of the crime .... In addition, the jury's
attention is focused on the characteristics of the person who committed the crime .....
109.

See JEFFRIES,supra note 4, at 435.

110. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
111. Id. at 892-96.
112. JEFFRIES, supra note 4, at 443-45; see Sullivan v. Wainwright, 464 U.S. 109,
112 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring in denial of application for stay); Gray v. Lucas, 463
U.S. 1237, 1237 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring in denial of petition for certiorari and
application for stay).
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were required to grant certiorari, and three votes were required to hold a
case if a pending Court decision was related to the issues raised in the
petition seeking review."' 3 In 1985, Justice Powell proposed that the Court
change its rules to require five votes to grant certiorari in capital cases since
that was the number required to grant a stay of execution.1 4 Under his
proposal, the Court would not continue to be put in the position of having
four votes to grant certiorari to hear the case, but not enough votes to grant
a stay of execution so that the defendant wasn't executed in the interim. 5
Ultimately, the Court did not then change its rules.
Justice Powell's best-known capital punishment decision is McCleskey
v. Kemp,"'6 where the Court addressed the issue of race discrimination and
the death penalty."' In McCleskey, the Court ruled that a death sentence
was constitutional, notwithstanding a complex statistical study that
indicated a risk that racial considerations entered into the decision to seek
and impose a death sentence. 18 According to Justice Powell, Warren
McCleskey was unable to establish a violation of his right to equal
protection of the law because he was unable to show that he was sentenced
to death because of his race or that the state enacted or retained its system
of capital punishment because of its anticipated discriminatory effects.
McCleskey's Eighth Amendment claim was rejected because he was unable
to show that there was a constitutionally unacceptable risk that racial
considerations influenced the capital decision process." 9
Just over two months later, in June 1987, Justice Powell retired from
the Supreme Court. His judicial legacy is as a conservative, pragmatic
judge, who took a non-ideological approach to deciding cases. 2 u As a
result, he often cast the deciding vote in cases decided by a 5-4 vote. Justice
Powell considered each case on its own merits, focusing on the facts,
without attempting to decide issues not before the Court. He often balanced
the competing claims of the parties in his opinions. Justice Powell, too, was

113. See JEFFRIES, supra note 4, at 445.
114. LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN'S
SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 167-72 (2005); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1961-1991, at 163-73 (1997).

115. Despite believing that seeking a stay was part of an effort to delay executions,
Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger, out of concern for the institutional legitimacy of the
Court, developed a policy of casting the fifth vote for a stay. TUSHNET, supra note 114, at
170.
116. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
117. Id. at 282-83.
118. Id. at 291.
119. Id. at 298-99.
120. ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at 265-67. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., A
Tribute to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 HARV. L. REv. 395 (1987); Stephen Breyer, In
Memoriam: Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 112 HARV. L. REV. 589 (1999).
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heralded as being willing to reconsider some of his previously held judicial
views. His kindness and courteousness were legendary and were attributed
to his Southern aristocratic upbringing.
In 1988, he accepted Chief Justice Rehnquist's invitation to chair the
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases (known as
the Powell Committee), which was to consider the problem of delay in
capital cases. The following year, Justice Powell published a Commentary
in the Harvard Law Review, in which he reaffirmed his view that the death
penalty was constitutional.121 The Commentary criticized the "excessively
repetitious litigation and years of delay between sentencing and execution"
in capital cases,122 and suggested that Congress and the state legislatures
should consider whether "a punishment that is being enforced only
haphazardly is in the public interest." 23 The Powell Committee's Report,
published around the same time, echoed these sentiments and included
among its proposals providing capital defense attorneys in state court
proceedings (at trial, on appeal, and in post-conviction proceedings) and
barring more than one federal habeas petition to review the conviction and
death sentence. 2AThe Committee's recommendations were not enacted into
law.125
Justice Powell continued to speak on capital punishment. In 1990, he
shared with his biographer that if he were a state legislator he would vote
against the death penalty because it was not being enforced.126 The next
year, he stated that capital punishment should be abolished because it was
not being enforced expeditiously.12 7 According to his biographer, Justice
Powell's Supreme Court service taught him that the death penalty was a
failed experiment in judicial lawmaking, which would never work. 8

121. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Commentary, CapitalPunishment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1035
(1989).
122. Id. at 1035.
123. Id. at 1046.
124. See Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases Committee
Report, Judicial Conference of the U.S., Committee Report and Proposal, reprintedin 135
CONG. REc. 24694 (1989).
125. The Supreme Court later interpreted the federal habeas corpus laws in line with
the Powell Committee's recommendations. For example, in McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467
(1991), the Court prohibited the filing of successive writs that asserted a previously raised
claim. Most of the Committee's other suggestions were later codified by the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act. See John H. Blume, ADEPA: The "Hype" and the "Bite,"
91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 266-74 (2006).
126. JEFFRIES, supra note 4, at 453.

127.
128.

Id.
Id.
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D. Justice John PaulStevens
In November 1975, when Justice William Douglas resigned from the
Supreme Court, President Gerald Ford instructed the Attorney General of
the United States to "[fjind me another Lewis Powell." 2 In making judicial
appointments, President Ford focused more on a nominee's qualifications
and tried to select persons with whom he was politically and ideologically
compatible.130 President Ford sought someone who would restrain the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. 3' He also preferred appellate court
nominees with judicial experience. 32
John Paul Stevens, a federal appellate judge for five years and a
perceived moderate conservative and centrist, was selected and confirmed
to the Court sixteen days later in December 1975.' When Justice Stevens
joined the Court he was a swing vote--equally likely to vote with his
conservative or liberal colleagues-but over his tenure he voted more
frequently with the more liberal members of the Court.134 Throughout his
service, he had a high pro-rights or pro-individual score.'35 Though he
exhibited the trait as a court of appeals judge, more than most of his
Supreme Court colleagues, Justice Stevens was apt to write a separate
concurring or dissenting opinion. 136 He usually declined to compromise his
views to obtain a Court majority. 37
An early exception to Justice Stevens' go-it-alone approach was his
joining with Justice Stewart and Justice Powell in 1976 to co-author the
controlling plurality opinions that established the parameters of the modern
system of capital punishment, as discussed above. In his last years on the
Court, Justice Stevens voted to limit the reach of capital punishment. In
doing so, he may have laid the foundation for judicial abolition of the

129.

Id. at 419.

130. ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at 274-75.
131. Id. at 276.
132. Id. at 274.
133. Id. at 276. Due to Justice Douglas' declining health and the close vote among its
members, the Court delayed deciding capital punishment cases until his successor joined the
Court. Thus, like Justice Powell, within weeks of his arrival Justice Stevens was hearing
arguments on and having to decide the constitutionality of the death penalty.
134. Id.; BILL BARNHART AND GENE SCHLICKMAN, JOHN PAUL STEVENS: AN
INDEPENDENT LIFE 205-06 (2010).
135. ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at 276.
136. BARNHART & SCHLICKMAN, supra note 134, at 200-02. Justice Stevens has
explained that he believes that the public should know if there is disagreement within an
appellate court on how a case should be resolved. John Paul Stevens, Foreword to KENNETH
A. MANASTER, ILLINOIS JUSTICE: THE SCANDAL OF 1969 AND THE RISE OF JOHN PAUL
STEVENS, at xii (2001).
137. BARNHART & SCHLICKMAN, supra note 134, at 200-09; MANASTER, supra note
136, at 273.
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sanction. In 2002, he wrote Atkins v. Virginia,138 which declared that it was
not objective social factors, but the Justices' own judgment, that determined
whether a capital punishment practice was constitutional.' 39 Three years
later, he was a member of the majority that decided Roper v. Simmons,"O
which used Atkins' methodology, and focused on the apparent rate of
change in death penalty policies as reflecting the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.141
In 2008, Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion in a capital case,
Baze v. Rees.' 42 In Baze, the Court ruled that a three-drug protocol used in
the lethal injection of capital prisoners did not violate the Constitution.14 3
Though he joined in that conclusion, Justice Stevens used his opinion to
announce that he had reconsidered the utility of capital punishment.
He first noted that Gregg proffered three justifications for capital
punishment: deterrence, retribution, and incapacitation.'" None of these
aims was achieved under the modem capital punishment processes, he
stated.14 5 Accordingly, Justice Stevens examined whether it was "time to
kill" the death penalty.'4 He noted that Atkins and other capital cases often
relied on the judgment of the Justices and that that judgment could be based
on data that fell short of absolute proof.147
The 1976 cases were premised on the development of adequate
procedures to cure the deficiencies identified in Furman. Justice Stevens
noted, however, that due to subsequent Supreme Court decisions, capital
defendants received fewer protections than non-capital defendants. He
identified the following significant concerns: capital defendants were more
likely denied a trial by jurors representing a fair cross 'section of the
community; there was a risk of error in capital cases because of the
structure of the capital sentencing phase; 4 there was a risk of
discriminatory application of the death penalty; and a risk of executing the
innocent. In light of these apprehensions, Justice Stevens stated that "any

138. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
139. Id. at 312.
140. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
141. Id. at 567.
142. 553 U.S. 35 (2008).
143. Id. at 47, 63.
144. Id. at 78 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 81.
147. Id. at 84.
148. Justice Stevens noted some states had changed their sentencing proceedings to
obviate the sentencer's reliance on residual doubt as to guilt and that some states allowed
victim impact evidence in the sentencing phase.
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penalty more severe than life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole" is constitutionally excessive, and therefore unlawful.14
Notwithstanding his conclusion that the death penalty was
unconstitutional, Justice Stevens pledged to respect the precedents that
upheld the sanction.!so Like Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun,
who all declared the death penalty unconstitutional while members of the
Court, Justice Stevens reached that same conclusion. Unlike that trio,
Justice Stevens did not thereafter dissent from every capital case he
reviewed. In subsequent cases in which plenary review was granted he
continued to address the arguments made by the parties without mentioning
his prior conclusion that the death penalty was unconstitutional.15
Justice Stevens retired from the Supreme Court in June 2010. His
legacy is as a pragmatic judge, unafraid to consider new approaches to
recurring problems or to reconsider previously adopted positions.
Sometimes Justice Stevens was alone; on other occasions his colleagues
joined him. Similar to Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens saw the
composition of the Court change during his tenure, with a steady addition
of Justices who were more conservative than he. Accordingly, during the
last decade of his service, Justice Stevens' once moderate-conservative
position seemed liberal, and he was more apt to vote with the outcome that
the more ideologically liberal justices favored.15 2 Justice Stevens never lost
the "maverick" label he was branded with early in his tenure, and upon his
retirement, he seemed to revel in being classified both as a maverick and as
an independent-minded judge.'5 3 Justice Stevens, as the senior associate
Justice since 1994, had the authority to choose which of his colleagues
would write the Court's opinion when the Chief Justice was not in the
majority. Contrary to the stereotype as an intellectual loner, Justice Stevens
used that assignment power felicitously.154

149. Baze, 553 U.S. at 86 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010); Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S.
53 (2009); Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (2009).
152. ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at 276.
153. See generally BARNHART & SCHLICKMAN, supra note 134. Jeffrey Rosen, The
Dissenter,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, at 50. ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at 276-79.
154. Charles F. Jacobs & Christopher E. Smith, The Influence of Justice John Paul
Stevens: Opinion Assignments by the Senior Associate Justice, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV.

743 (2011). Jacobs and Smith provide examples of the apparent strategic assignment of
opinions by Justice Stevens in an array of substantive areas, including in capital cases such
as Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2008), and Kennedy v. Louisiana,554 U.S. 407 (2008). Id. at 753-

72.
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E. Saying Good-bye to CapitalPunishment
Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens each did not question the
legitimacy of capital punishment early in their tenure. It is worth
remembering that these three Justices are each properly viewed as
philosophically moderate-conservative judges. They were not ideologues on
criminal law, and if they didn't generally keep an open mind in that area,
they were at least willing to reconsider their earlier thinking on the subject.
Simply put, they were empathetic judges, 55 who let the facts guide them in
applying the law.
Furthermore, when they turned away from the death penalty, none of
the trio declared that the death penalty was per se unconstitutional. Instead,
they condemned the operation of capital punishment, accepting that death
can be a permissible punishment.
Justice Blackmun's and Justice Stevens' change of mind occurred while
still members of the Supreme Court, and they placed their d6nouement to
the death penalty in the United States Reports. These were undoubtedly
calculated decisions, announced as each was considering retiring and likely
his judicial legacy. Now, future Justices, lawyers, and academics can study
their reasoning. Equally important, though, is that the world, which can
access decades of their opinions adjudicating capital punishment issues, can
just as easily retrieve their statements recanting the death penalty.
One does not have to study their sayonaras to state executions for long
to see that what Justice Blackmun condemned-the twin commands of
guided discretion and individualized sentencing announced in the 1976
cases-is what Justice Stevens both invented and praised. Both Justices
point to subsequent decisions of the Court-their colleagues (whom they
sometimes aided and abetted)-as being at fault.
Justice Powell is different. Four years into retirement when asked by
his biographer whether he would change his vote in any case, he responded:
"I would vote the other way in any capital case..

.

. Yes. I have come to

think that capital punishment should be abolished." 56
This is quite a turn of events. Justice Powell's biographer notes that
Justice Powell's more conservative colleagues endeavored to reduce the
delay between imposition of the death sentence and execution by
circumscribing the avenues for judicial review. Justice Powell, too,
proceeded in this direction. As a Justice, he consistently voted to restrict the

155. Every judge uses empathy. The question becomes how much and when. As
Senator and President Barack Obama stated, empathy was a criterion in confirming and
selecting judicial nominees. For an exploration of empathy and judging, see Thomas B.
Colby, In Defense ofJudicialEmpathy, 96 MIN. L. REV. 1944 (2012); Neal R. Feigenson,
Sympathy andLegalJudgment: A PsychologicalAnalysis, 65 TENN. L. REV. I (1997); Lynn
N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987).
156. JEFFRIES, supra note 4, at 451.
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reach of the writ of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners,5 7 and gave
speeches on the need to restrict habeas.'5 8 He also sought to change the
Court's internal rules on granting stays of execution. In retirement, he
chaired and endorsed the Powell Committee's habeas law restrictions, and
proposed similar changes to federal law in his Harvard Law Review
article.159 Yet, according to his biographer, Justice Powell's turnaround was
attributable to capital punishment cases themselves.
From them Powell learned that the death penalty would never be routinely
applied .... Powell knew firsthand their deadly hold on the judge's peace
of mind. He knew how hard it was not to take a second, third, or fourth
look at rejected claims, how easy it seemed to put the whole thing off for
one more hearing, how much courage-or callousness-it took to treat
death like any other penalty. Some judges could achieve that emotional
distance, but Powell came to believe that the system as a whole would
always be plagued by doubt and that doubting itself, it would inspire
resentment and contempt. '
If these were Justice Powell's feelings, he kept them to himself as he didn't
express any doubts in public, even after his retirement.
Missing from the biographer's account is an explanation-ideally, in
Powell's own words or by his own hand (for example in a law review
article or newspaper editorial)-explaining the reasons behind his change
of mind.'(" As currently presented, Justice Powell's transformation on
capital punishment seems too favorable a rendition by too sympathetic a
source-his former law clerk.162

157. Among the decisions of the Court that Justice Powell wrote addressing the
availability of the writ of habeas corpus are: Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) (holding
that harmless error standard applies to claim of improper jury instruction); Kuhlmann v.
Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (finding that a defendant must prove that state and its informant
acted deliberately to elicit incriminating statements in order to show that his right to counsel
was violated; and, for a plurality of the Court, finding that the ends of justice would not be
served by addressing a claim in a successive habeas petition, which had been rejected in
previous habeas petition); and Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (holding that search and
seizure claims cannot be raised in federal habeas if the state provided petitioner with a full
and fair opportunity to litigate Fourth Amendment issues in state court).
158. See Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear andDeath: Successive Problems in
CapitalFederalHabeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 714 n.75 (2002) (citations

omitted).
159. Powell, supra note 121.
160. JEFFRIES, supra note 4, at 452-53.
161. Justice Powell did such in 1990 when he publicly repudiated his vote in the 1986
case of Bowers v. Hardwick.Id. at 530.
162. The biographer, in contrast, is appropriately critical of Justice Powell's handling
of Bowers v. Hardwick.Id. at 527-30.

Justice Powell's supposed capital punishment repudiation explanation reads like
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Regretfully, none of the Justices fully documented their doubts about
the death penalty as they arose. Understandably, a judge who hedges or
equivocates on the important issue of the death penalty creates uncertainty
within the capital punishment system. Yet, it may be that all we are entitled
to is "a jurisprudence of doubt" 63 when it comes to capital punishment.
Justice Marshall's hypothesis suggested as much in Furman.
V. CONCLUSION

This Introduction has highlighted Justice Marshall's perceptive insights
on the death penalty. His hypothesis has been tested and written about for
decades. Social scientists have confirmed parts of his thesis. Decades of
constitutional regulation of the death penalty may have left us no better off
than when the death penalty was condemned in Furman.
Three of Justice Marshall's colleagues-Justice Blackmun, Justice
Powell, and Justice Stevens-all upper class Republican white men,
eventually withdrew their support for capital punishment. Their actions lend
support to Justice Marshall's hypothesis that individuals fully informed
about the administration of the death penalty would conclude that it was an
unwise policy. Additionally, if his fellow jurists are viewed as retaining an
open mind on capital punishment, their actions further corroborate the
related social science research, notwithstanding their social and political
backgrounds.
Justice Blackmun's, Justice Powell's and Justice Stevens' considered
conclusions reflect that though each was qualified when first fitted for his
Supreme Court robe, they did not become hard-headed ideologues on the
Court. Rather, after attempting to foster a national conversation on capital
punishment with the state and national legislatures and executive branches
in 1976, their shoulders expanded as they reconceived their role as judges.
In the end, they each concluded that the Court had not held up its end of the
dialogue, and that the death penalty as presently administered is
unconstitutional.
Justice Marshall was correct that those who come to the subject with a
relatively open mind cannot help but be in wonderment by this country's
death penalty, especially its many contradictions. Perhaps the only thing

an end-of-life confession or a will manumitting slaves. While eternal rest is not mine to give,
I believe that a personal confession and genuine repentance are sufficient to absolve one of
wrongdoing in this world. See Luke 23:39-43. The personal nature of Justice Powell's socalled confession is missing. Like Justice Marshall, I am put off by the "southernness" of the
action-realizing it is wrong, but seeking only private absolution for actions that had
widespread public impact. See HOWARD BALL, A DEFIANT LIFE: THURGOOD MARSHALL
267 (1998).
The idea is from Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844

AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACISM IN AMERICA

163.

(1992) (plurality).
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slightly more astonishing is that so many who support the death penalty
know relatively little about how it actually works. If a better death penalty
is in the offing, then both death penalty abolitionists and capital punishment
retentionists at least have to talk about their differences.
Ms. Enekwa's Comment has a formula for how that conversation can
start.

